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Abstract
Objectives Meditation may be viewed as a way to enhance mindfulness and self-awareness. To date, most studies have relied on
instruments based on self-evaluations. The aim of this study was to explore aspects of self-awareness in experienced meditators
compared to non-meditators using a multi-method approach.
Methods Thirty-five experienced meditators and 47 matched control participants completed tests ranging from self-report
questionnaires of mindfulness skills and psychological mindedness to emotion reports in a scenario task and a behavioral task
in which spontaneous momentary experiences are verbally reported.
Results Compared to controls, meditators scored higher on self-reported introspective interest and mindfulness skills, but not on
emotional awareness. Meditators also showed higher interoception scores during the spontaneous verbal reports task.
Interestingly, while mindfulness/Vipassana meditators scored lower on a self-reported mindfulness skill compared to transcen-
dental meditators, they reported more momentary interoceptive and exteroceptive phenomena during the task, the differences
being large.
Conclusions Different methods assessing complementary aspects of self-awareness show partially mutually opposing results
when meditator and non-meditator groups are compared. These results indicate the added value of behavioral tasks when
assessing awareness-related phenomena.
Keywords Awareness . Consciousness . Introspection .Meditation .Mindfulness
Meditation is a concept that is difficult to define. Scholars use
different definitions, with different emphases (Bond et al.
2009; Cahn and Polich 2006; Walsh and Shapiro 2006).
Taking aspects from these previous definitions into account,
meditation is conceptualized as a self-applied practice of train-
ing attention and awareness, without analysis or evaluation of
the process or result, to enhance general well-being and/or
specific capacities such as calm, concentration, and insight.
When categorizing meditation types, a main distinction may
be made between (i) meditation practices focusing attention
on a specific object, such as a mantra or specific bodily or
sensory sensations, and (ii) practices involving a more open
monitoring of any phenomena that may take place in the pres-
ent moment (Cahn and Polich 2006; Lutz et al. 2008). These
two types have been shown to be related to different neuro-
physiological concomitants (Lutz et al. 2008; Travis and
Shear 2010).
Both types of practice are often used in various meditation
traditions, such as yogic meditation traditions, Zen,
Vipassana, and Tibetan Buddhist traditions, as well as more
popular and clinical applications, such as mindfulness-based
stress reduction (MBSR) (Kabat-Zinn 1990). An important
aim of these techniques is some form of reduction of stress
or suffering, ranging from partial reduction to complete abol-
ishment as in Buddhist approaches (Ekman et al. 2005; Kabat-
Zinn 1990; Thera 1972).
In the many Buddhist traditions, by systematic meditative
introspection, one practices a “clear and single-minded aware-
ness of what actually happens to us and in us at the successive
moments of perception,” which is a “purely receptive state of
mind” (Thera 1972) (p. vii-viii). Because this awareness is a
central aspect of meditation training, it seems important to be
able to measure aspects of such awareness in research into the
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effects of meditation training. Such receptive awareness may
be seen as distinct from the more reflexive forms of self-
awareness, such as “reflection” (Trapnell and Campbell
1999) and the public self-consciousness aspect of self-
consciousness (Fenigstein et al. 1975). In these forms, one
actively is reflecting upon the phenomena observed during
introspection, whereas meditative introspection is pre-
reflexive; it just “offers a bare display of what is taking place”
(Shear and Jevning 1999) (p. 204). It follows that self-report
evaluations may have a difficulty to adequately assess this pre-
reflexive form of awareness. It can be argued that any kind of
self-report in which participants have to evaluate their own
functioning involves a reflective component. Nevertheless,
self-report instruments are the most widely used kind of in-
struments, and they have also advanced the field of self-
awareness research. An example is the subfield of mindful-
ness research.
While there is some debate on the exact definition of mind-
fulness, most use a one- or two-component definition: (i) pay-
ing attention to and being aware of phenomena taking place in
the present moment (Brown and Ryan 2003; Thera 1972),
often expanded with (ii) in an accepting or nonjudgmental
way (Baer et al. 2006; Bishop et al. 2004; Kabat-Zinn
1994). Various self-report instruments have been developed
and used in research, some of which unidimensional, others
multidimensional. This has greatly advanced research into the
topic of mindfulness, as meaningful associations with other
constructs have been reported; the self-report measures have
shown sensitivity to change during mindfulness interventions
(Baer et al. 2004; Baer et al. 2006; Brown and Ryan 2003) and
to mediate the effects of mindfulness interventions on psycho-
logical well-being (Bränström et al. 2011; Nyklíček and
Kuijpers 2008). Nevertheless, an important question is to what
extent one is able to evaluate the extent to which one is aware
of present-moment phenomena in an unbiased way
(Grossman 2008, 2011). Studies comparing (experienced)
meditators to non-meditators regarding their self-reported
mindfulness usually find differences between the groups
(Baer et al. 2008; Brown and Ryan 2003; Lau et al. 2006;
Walach et al. 2006), although not always (Baer et al. 2008).
Therefore, multi-method assessments, including performance-
based measures assessing actual behavior, are recommended
to have a more complete picture of mindfulness and related
self-awareness phenomena (Baer 2016).
As outlined above, momentary introspective monitoring as
practiced in many meditation forms is expected to result in
enhanced awareness of phenomena taking place in the mo-
ment. Therefore, it is important to examine if this would be
reflected in differences between groups of meditators and
meditation-naïve participants regarding different measures
assessing self-awareness-related constructs. Besides self-
report evaluation measures, an imaginative scenario task
assessing emotional awareness and a behavioral verbal report
task assessing spontaneous momentary stream-of-
consciousness phenomena have been used to examine poten-
tial differences between these different methods.
Regarding the latter method, the challenge is to find an
appropriate task, which would reflect awareness of present-
moment phenomena similar to awareness as trained in most
forms of introspective meditation training. In both concentra-
tive and open monitoring meditation, the practice usually in-
volves awareness of all momentary phenomena, albeit in
many meditation practices, some phenomena receive more
attention (often interoceptive sensations, such as related to
breathing), while others may be only monitored to become
aware of and return to the object of the primary focus. These
forms of attention training, which usually occur in a stimulus-
free environment, are supposed to counteract the habitual ten-
dency to wander off into automatic thinking when resting,
facilitating awareness of perceptual phenomena (Schooler
et al. 2011). Therefore, the behavioral task preferably should
assess awareness of (i) all kinds of phenomena, including the
often important interoceptive ones (ii) taking place in the suc-
cessive ongoing moments, (iii) in a spontaneous way, i.e., not
triggered or interrupted by stimuli, and (iv) in an unbiased
way, i.e., not prompted toward a certain response. Finally, it
should be possible to obtain scores on the task, resulting in a
quantitative variable.
In previous work in different research areas, methods have
been developed that may fulfill some of these criteria. The
popular experience sampling or ecological momentary meth-
odology is typically based on many repeated reports of expe-
riences that occurred before a signal (Linz et al. 2018;
Smallwood et al. 2009). Although this methodology has large
benefits, it has some potentially serious limitations as well.
The assessment is not a real-time assessment of ongoing ex-
perience in a stimulus-free context. Especially in the context
of a stimulus-free task, in which the mind may easily wander,
retrospective reports may be inaccurate (Hurlburt and Heavey
2015; Van Calster et al. 2017). In addition, the signals
prompting to report can create a disruption in the spontaneous
activity, and when predefined response categories are applied,
this may lead to underreported or misclassified phenomena
when the appropriate response category is not available (Van
Calster et al. 2017).
Another method that has already been used in older work
has been called the “think aloud” procedure. During this pro-
cedure, participants are instructed to tell all their thoughts
usually while performing a task, already applied by Watson
in the early twentieth century and further elaborated upon by
others (Ericsson and Crutcher 1991; Pennebaker et al. 1990).
However, this procedure was usually confined to thoughts
only in the context of a cognitive task, such as a mental arith-
metic task. Procedures involving also other experiences in the
absence of stimuli have also been designed, however again
typically involving retrospective reports of experience
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occurring some time after the experience (Fox et al. 2012;
Hurlburt 2009; Lehmann et al. 1998; Reinsel et al. 1986).
Recently, these two approaches have been combined in a
neurophenomenological study, in which a free verbalization
of momentary experience task was applied during a stimulus-
free period to examine the brain’s default mode activity (Van
Calster et al. 2017).
It was hypothesized that meditators would not only score
higher on self-report measures of mindfulness and introspec-
tive interest and insight but also on tasks assessing emotional
self-awareness and momentary phenomenological reports, es-
pecially reflecting interoception. This effect was expected to
be most pronounced in Zen and Vipassana meditators, com-
pared to transcendental meditators, as introspection and




Two groups of participants were approached: individuals with
experience in various meditation forms and individuals with
no experience with meditation or other potentially awareness
enhancing practice (e.g., yoga, qi gong, and tai chi).
Participants were recruited from meditation centers in the
Zen, Vipassana, and transcendental meditation traditions in
and around the city of Tilburg, Southern Netherlands. The
centers were approached by telephone or e-mail to ex-
plain the study and ask if participants of their centers
may be approached by letter. In addition, former stu-
dents of a mindfulness-based stress reduction center in
Tilburg were recruited by e-mail. Individuals with expe-
rience in meditation were included if they had more
than 1 year of ongoing experience with meditation and
were practicing meditation at least 3 days a week for at
least 20 min per session.
Meditation-naïve participants were initially recruited via
participants of the meditators group, who were asked to recruit
someone with more or less the same demographic character-
istics. Because many people of the meditators group were not
able to find someone for the control group and because mean
age of the meditators was above 50 years, additional partici-
pants were recruited at the university. Groups who followed
art and science courses designed specifically for post midlife
participants were approached to this end. The meditator and
non-meditator groups were matched on age and sex and pref-
erably also on education.
Individuals were excluded from the study if they were cur-
rently undergoing psychological treatment, having a cardiac
disease or a severe visual or auditory impairment. Cardiac
patients were excluded because of possible interference with
cardiovascular measurements during some tasks (not reported
here).
Included were 82 participants: 35 meditators and 47 non-
meditators. Of the meditators, most practiced Vipassana/
mindfulness or transcendental meditation (see Table 1), had
on average 19.6 ± 12.0 years of meditation experience (range
2–41 years), and practiced on average 5.50 ± 1.42 days per
week (range 3–7) for 30.0 ± 13.9 min per session (range 20–
45). The meditators and non-meditators appeared to be well-
matched regarding age (mean = 53.6 ± 11.3 years) and sex
(43, 54%, women) (Table 1). However, it appeared difficult
to find meditators with lower than high professional educa-
tion: only 1 was found, compared to 15 in the non-meditators
group (χ2 (1) = 8.98, p = 0.003). In addition, meditators re-
ported more often to have experienced negative life events
(χ2 (1) = 5.62, p = 0.02) and to have had psychological prob-
lems in the past (χ2 (1) = 5.27, p = 0.02). Therefore, in rele-
vant analyses, these variables were controlled.
Procedures
By means of a letter, participants were informed that they
would take part in a study about meditation, attention, and
introspection. All participants provided informed consent
and received a gift coupon of 20 euro.
Participants completed a series of questionnaires and per-
formed tasks in a laboratory at Tilburg University. The exper-
imental part lasted about 2 h and consisted of several tasks of
which the behavioral report task was the first. Before the tasks,
questionnaires were completed.
Measures
A form was completed with questions concerning demo-
graphics and other background information: age, sex, educa-
tion level, history of psychological problems (e.g., anxiety,
depression, burnout), and negative life events which had a
“significant impact on one’s life.” Education level was cate-
gorized into high (higher professional education or university
education) and low (all other).
Self-Reported Mindfulness
The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) (Baer
et al. 2006) was applied to assess five facets of self-reported
mindfulness skills by the following subscales: noticing exter-
nal and internal phenomena (Observe), ability to describe
one’s thoughts and feelings (Describe), acting with awareness
(Actaware), letting go of unpleasant inner experience
(Nonreact), and not judging one’s thoughts and feelings
(Nonjudge). The questionnaire consists of 39 items, all rated
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never or very rarely
true) to 5 (very often or always true). The five scales
Mindfulness (2020) 11:1028–10371030
previously demonstrated adequate to good internal consisten-
cy, with alpha coefficients ranging from 0.75 to 0.91, and
relationships between the scales and other variables were con-
sistent with predictions in most cases (Baer et al. 2006). Also,
the Dutch version has shown adequate reliability and validity
(de Bruin et al. 2012).
Self-Reported Introspective Interest and Insight
The Balanced Index of Psychological Mindedness (BIPM)
assesses the “interest and ability to be in touch with and reflect
on one’s psychological states and processes” (Nyklíček and
Denollet 2009)(p. 32). The BIPM consists of 14 items mea-
sured on a Likert scale ranging from 0 (not true) to 4 (very
much true). Per subscale, 7 items assess two variables: Interest
(in introspection) and Insight. The subscales of the Dutch
version show adequate internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha
of 0.76 for Insight and 0.85 for Interest), and test-retest reli-
ability (r = 0.63 and r = 0.71, respectively) (Nyklíček and
Denollet 2009).
Emotional Awareness Task
The Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS) (Lane et al.
1990) consists of 10 (brief version) to 20 scripts containing
affective imaginary scenes involving interaction between the
participant and another person. Participants indicate how they
and the other person would feel in each situation. Responses
are scored by raters using a standardized list of words on a
scale of 0 (no emotion reported) to 5 (highest level of emo-
tional awareness). Averaged scores across the scenarios sub-
sequently reflect the variables emotional Self-awareness,
emotional Other-awareness, and a total awareness score.
Reliability (interrater reliability of 0.84) and validity have
been shown to be adequate (Lane et al. 1990). For the purpose
of this study, the LEAS was translated by means of the back-
translation method into Dutch. Because of unsuitability of
some items for the Dutch situation, we selected 10 scenarios
which would (i) cover the range of situations and emotions
from the original and (ii) would fit the Dutch situation.
Subsequently, respondents’ answers were rated by two inde-
pendent raters to evaluate its reliability. The intraclass corre-
lation between the two raters was 0.68 for awareness of own
emotions (Self-awareness), 0.80 for awareness of others’ emo-
tions (Other-awareness), and 0.70 for the total score.
Monitoring of Momentary Experience Task
A version of the “think aloud” procedure (Ericsson and
Crutcher 1991; Van Calster et al. 2017) was applied.
Participants received the following instructions on a computer
screen: (i) “For the next three minutes, please describe what, at
the moment, you are experiencing/what is going through your
mind. In this task there is no right or wrong, it’s all about your
own experience. However, try to speak frankly (all informa-
tion will be treated confidentially). The task will start straight-
away”, after which the second instruction appeared: “You can
start talking now. Describe simply what you are experiencing /
what is going through your mind at the moment.” During the
task, the last instruction stayed visible as well as a screen time
beam that counted off the 3 min. The instruction was kept
brief, without further explanation not to prompt a certainmode
of attentiveness or awareness, but to let the more automatic
tendency of that moment get expressed. While performing the
task, participants were recorded on video for later scoring of
their reports. Participants were told that this was done only to
be able to score their answers afterward.
The transcribed reports were coded for presence of one of
several categories. First, the transcriptions were divided into
meaningful semantic units, consisting of words together
forming a new piece of information compared to the preceding
three units. Usually, this is a part of a sentence. These units
were subsequently scored into mutually exclusive categories,
relevant to awareness of present-moment phenomena
Table 1 Participant
characteristics: means and






t or χ2 value
Age 54.1 (9.0) 53.2 (12.7) 0.36
Female 19 (56%) 24 (52%) 0.11
High educationa 33 (97%) 31 (67%) 8.98**
Meditation form and years of experience –
Vipassana (N = 15) 20.3 (9.7) years
Zen (N = 3) 25.0 (18.3) years
Transcendental (N = 11) 21.4 (12.6) years
Combination (N = 5) 10.4 (13.0) years
Negative life events 24 (71%) 19 (41%) 5.62*
Psychological problems 23 (68%) 18 (39%) 5.27*
a High education is high professional education or university; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
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(Hurlburt and Heavey 2015; Van Calster et al. 2017;
Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2011), based on content analysis
(Neuendorf and Skalski 2002): (i) thoughts. These were
subdivided into thoughts about the present, the past, and the
future (e.g., “tomorrow I will go to the movies”), (ii) current
affective states (affective states without any reference to their
expression in the body, e.g., “I feel annoyed”), (iii) current
bodily sensations (e.g., “I feel my relaxed muscles”), and
(iv) current exteroceptive perceptions (e.g., “I see this white
monitor”). The scoring of the expressions into categories was
performed by two independent raters. These were two under-
graduate students of psychology, who were trained by the
author to score expressions using a written manual, scored
examples, and practice transcripts with feedback. The training
time was approximately 5 h. The following variables were
operationalized besides Thinking (the number of thoughts re-
ported): (i) Interoception (the number of reported bodily sen-
sations); (ii) Exteroception (the number of reported exterocep-
tive perceptions); and (iii) Affect (the number of reported af-
fective states).
Social Desirability
The tendency to give overly positive answers was assessed by
the Repressive Defensiveness scale of the Weinberger
Adjustment Inventory (Weinberger and Schwartz 1990) to
assess associations of the other instruments with this tendency.
It has 11 items reflecting mild undesirable, but common be-
haviors, like “Once in a while I say bad things about people
that I would not say in front of them” and “Once in a while I
say things that are not completely true.” The items are scored
on 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (completely disagree)
to 5 (completely agree). The Cronbach’s alpha of the original
version is 0.76, while 2-week test-retest reliabilities were
0.75–0.88, and validity is also established (Turvey and
Salovey 1994; Weinberger and Schwartz 1990). The Dutch
version, consisting of 9 items, has a Cronbach alpha’s of be-
tween 0.76 and 0.83 and substantial correlation with another
measure of social desirability (Nyklíček et al. 1998).
Data Analyses
Data were analyzed using SPSS version 24. First, exploratory
Pearson product moment correlations were computed between
the dependent variables to evaluate their interrelations. This is
especially valuable as one of the measuring instruments is
new. Although this involved 40 correlations, no correction
for multiple comparison was applied because the aim of these
correlations was only to provide a background for the inter-
pretation of the analyses related to the hypotheses. To test the
hypotheses, differences between groups regarding the relevant
self-awareness-related variables were tested using indepen-
dent samples t tests and covariance analyses (ANCOVAs).
In the ANCOVAs, differences between groups were adjusted
for relevant variables on which groups differed, potentially
including age, sex, level of education (high/low), history of
psychological problems (yes/no), and negative life events
(yes/no).
Given the multiple ANCOVAs performed, α values were
adjusted using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure with a 10%
false discovery rate (FDR) (Thissen et al. 2002). The compu-
tation was using the 11 variables the hypotheses refer to: 5
FFMQ subscales, 2 BIPM subscales, 1 from the LEAS
assessing emotional self-awareness, and 3 momentary self-
monitoring variables from the behavioral task.
Results
Monitoring of Momentary Experiences Task
The mean number of scored entries across participants ranged
between 0.94 (SD = 0.94) in non-meditators and 2.06 (SD =
2.36) in meditators for exteroceptive phenomena to about 16
for all thoughts in both groups. The number of scored entries
did not differ between the two raters per category (t (162) < 1,
p > 0.10). Intraclass correlations between scores of the two
raters were as follows: 0.84 (thoughts about the present),
0.95 (thoughts about the past), 0.88 (thoughts about the fu-
ture), 0.71 (affects), 0.84 (bodily sensations), 0.81
(exteroceptions), and 0.94 (all categories). To enhance parsi-
mony, the three different thinking categories were summed
into one Thinking variable. Regarding distribution of the
resulting variables, however, almost all categories showed
highly skewed and dense (kurtosis) distributions. Therefore,
square root transformations were applied, resulting in accept-
ably normal distributions (both skewness and kurtosis < 1).
These transformed variables were used in all further
computations.
Exploratory Associations Between Constructs
Correlations between the self-report mindfulness variables
and the momentary self-monitoring task variables were large-
ly absent, except the expected correlation between Observe
and Exteroception (r = 0.28, p = 0.013) and between
Describe and Thinking (r = 0.28, p = 0.011).
Regarding other variables, introspective Interest correlated
significantly with some momentary self-monitoring variables,
especially with Interoception (r = 0.36, p = 0.001). The same
holds for emotional Self-awareness (r = 0.45 p < 0.001 with
Interoception). However, because 40 correlations were per-
formed between the dependent variables, an occasional signif-
icant correlation may have been due to chance. No correla-
tions were obtained with social desirability (Table 2).
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Differences Between Meditators and Non-Meditators
Meditators scored higher on self-reported mindfulness facets
compared to non-meditators, except for acting with awareness
(Table 3). When controlling for age, sex, education, and his-
tory of life events and psychological problems, these differ-
ences remained significant, except for Describe (p = 0.07, par-
tial η2 = 0.04), effect sizes being medium to large.
The largest difference between the groups was found on
Nonreact (F (1, 72) = 17.45, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.195).
Even larger difference between groups was found on the in-
trospective Interest subscale of psychological mindedness (F
(1, 72) = 32.18, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.315). Of the
covariables, sex showed a significant association with
Nonreact (F (1, 72) = 8.79, p = 0.004, partial η2 = 0.109) and
education with Interest (F (1, 72) = 4.63, p = 0.035, partial
η2 = 0.062): women scored lower on Nonreact compared to
men, and higher educated people scored higher on Interest
compared to lower educated participants.
There was no difference between meditators and non-
meditators regarding the number of entries (p > 0.10) or re-
ported thoughts (p > 0.10) in the momentary experiences task.
Meditators did score higher on most momentary self-
monitoring variables: Interoception (t (80) = 3.84, p < 0.001),
Affect (t (80) = 2.19, p = 0.03), with a trend for higher
Exteroception (t (80) = 1.85, p = 0.07). When controlled for
age, sex, education, history of psychological problems and life
events, Interoception remained the only variable significantly
differing between groups (F (1, 72) = 6.79 p = 0.01, with
highest FDR adjusted α = 0.045, partial η2 = 0.086). Of the
covariables, only history of psychological problems showed
a significant association with Exteroception (F (1, 72) = 7.22,
p = 0.009, partial η2 = 0.091): those with past psychological
problems showing higher scores.
No differences between groups were found on the Levels
of Emotional Awareness Scale.
Differences Between Meditation Forms
When these analyses were restricted to only the 15
mindfulness/Vipassana meditators versus non-meditators, the
differences regarding Interoception and Exteroception were
also significant (t (60) > 4.30, p ≤ 0.001). These effects
remained significant when controlled for demographic vari-
ables and history of life events and past psychological prob-
lems (F (1, 53) > 9.61, p ≤ 0.003, partial η2 > 0.15). Of the
covariables, again, only history of psychological problems
predicted Exteroception (p < 0.01).
When comparing mindfulness/Vipassana and TMmeditators
(the other categories contained too few participants), the mind-
fulness meditators scored higher on Interoception and
Exteroception (t (24) > 2.93), p < 0.008). These effects remained
significant showing large effects, when controlling for history of
psychological problems, which was the only covariable which
was associated with one of the self-monitoring variables: F (1,
23) = 7.88, p = 0.010, with highest FDR adjusted α = 0.027,
partial η2 = 0.26 for Interoception and F (1, 23) = 11.99, p =
0.002, partial η2 0.34, for Exteroception (Table 4).
Interestingly, when compared on the self-report instrument
for mindfulness, these subgroups did not differ, except signif-
icantly on Nonjudge (F (1, 23) = 8.93, p = 0.007, partial η2
0.28) with a nonsignificant trend for Nonreact (F (1, 23) =
3.81, p = 0.063 with FDR adjusted α = 0.036, partial η2 0.14):
TM scored higher on these mindfulness variables than
mindfulness/Vipassana meditators (Table 4). In this analysis,
education was the only variable showing an association with
self-reported mindfulness and adjusted for. No differences
were found on the other variables.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to explore aspects of self-
awareness of experienced meditators, using a multi-method
approach consisting of tests ranging from self-report to sce-
nario and behavioral tasks. Regarding evaluative self-report
instruments, as expected, the experienced meditators scored
higher on introspective interest and several mindfulness skills,
compared to controls. These effects remained significant
when adjusted for demographic characteristics, previous life
events, and psychological problems. Regarding the monitor-
ing of momentary experiences task, meditators showed higher
interoception scores compared to controls. This effect was
also anticipated as during many forms of meditation, attention
is directed at interoceptive phenomena, such as breathing sen-
sations. Because this focus is less clear in TM, it was expected
that meditators of this tradition would show lower scores on
interoception compared to the other meditators. Indeed, lower
scores were found on this measure, when comparing TMwith
the mindfulness/Vipassana group.
The finding that the mindfulness/Vipassana meditators did
not score higher on self-reported mindfulness skills compared to
TM practitioners deserves some comments. In fact, TM practi-
tioners scored significantly higher on nonjudging one’s thoughts
and feelings with a tendency for the same effect for nonreacting
to one’s unpleasant thoughts. The absence of higher scores in
mindfulnessmeditators compared to TM is consistent with stud-
ies showing (a) no difference between mindfulness and TM on
self-reported mindfulness (Schoormans and Nyklíček 2011),
and (b) TM enhancing self-reported mindfulness scores
(Tanner et al. 2009). The speculation that TM may enhance
mindfulness skills in an implicit way by accepting and not get-
ting involved in one’s thoughts and emotions while being atten-
tive to the performance of the mantra rehearsal seems plausible.
Whatever the mechanism may be, these studies together with
the present study show the added value of the inclusion of self-
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awareness-related measures based on methods other than eval-
uative self-report, enabling uncovering differences which would
remain obscure otherwise.
The absence of a difference between groups on emotional
self-awareness as assessed by the LEAS was not anticipated,
as both introspection and interoception, generally part of most
meditation forms, would be expected to enhance emotional
self-awareness (Kever et al. 2015; Terasawa et al. 2014).
However, it should be noted that the LEAS assesses one’s
imagined emotional reaction to scenarios. It may be speculat-
ed that a potentially enhanced emotional awareness may have
been counteracted by the putative effect of equanimity
claimed for most meditation practices (Desbordes et al. 2015).
To put the variables of the current monitoring of momen-
tary experience task into perspective, 40 explorative correla-
tions were computed between the task variables and variables
of existing measures. First, correlations were obtained with
emotional self-awareness as measured by the LEAS. As
discussed above, this may have been expected as emotional
self-awareness may be viewed as a result of meditation prac-
tice. Interestingly, this association was predominantly found
for interoception, not affective reports. As interoceptive
Table 2 Reliability and
correlations between spontaneous
momentary experience reports
and other psychological variables
Reliability Interoception Exteroception Affect Thinking
FFMQ: Observe 0.76 0.19# 0.28*




BIPM: Interest 0.85 0.36** 0.24*
BIPM: Insight 0.77 0.21#
LEAS: Self-awareness 0.68 0.45*** 0.20# 0.24*
LEAS: Other-awareness 0.80 0.21#
LEAS: Total awareness 0.70 0.39***
Social desirability 0.78
Scores of momentary experience reports are square root transformed; FFMQ Five Factor Mindfulness
Questionnaire; BIPM Balanced Index of Psychological Mindedness; LEAS Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale;
Reliability = Cronbach’s alpha for all constructs except the LEAS scales (intraclass correlation between two raters);
* p < 0.05; # p < 0.10 (r with p > 0.10 are not shown)
Table 3 Estimated marginal
means (and standard errors) of
meditators and non-meditators,
controlled for sex, age, education,







F value Partial η2
FFMQ: Observe 30.38 (1.52) 26.76 (1.21) 8.79** 0.11
FFMQ: Describe 29.43 (2.11) 26.34 (1.68) 3.33# 0.04
FFMQ: Actaware 27.20 (1.63) 26.66 (1.30) 0.17 0.00
FFMQ: Nonjudge 32.79 (1.74) 28.92 (1.39) 7.66** 0.10
FFMQ: Nonreact 26.50 (1.22) 22.40 (0.97) 17.45*** 0.20
BIPM: Interest 23.53 (1.60) 16.22 (1.27) 32.18*** 0.32
BIPM: Insight 22.66 (1.47) 21.35 (1.17) 1.21 0.02
LEAS: Self-awareness 2.47 (0.13) 2.33 (0.10) 1.77 0.03
LEAS: Other-awareness 2.34 (0.15) 2.40 (0.12) 0.28 0.00
LEAS: Total awareness 2.95 (0.11) 2.87 (0.09) 0.81 0.01
Interoception 1.46 (0.33) 0.77 (0.26) 6.09* 0.09
Exteroception 0.57 (0.24) 0.47 (0.20) 0.23 0.00
Affect 1.15 (0.23) 0.85 (0.18) 2.67 0.04
Thinking 3.42 (0.42) 3.68 (0.34) 0.58 0.01
Social desirability 33.79 (2.95) 27.62 (2.35) 6.72* 0.09
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; # 0.05 < p < 0.10; hypotheses-related variables are in boldface; momentary experience
reports variables are square root transformed; FFMQ Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire; BIPM Balanced
Index of Psychological Mindedness; LEAS, Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale
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phenomena may be more salient and changing in this brief
context compared to affects, this outcome may not be too
surprising. In addition, it is known that somatosensory phe-
nomena and affect are closely linked (Adolphs et al. 2000;
Rudrauf et al. 2009). However, one must note that because
of the number of correlations performedwithout correction for
multiple comparisons, an occasional significant correlation
may have been due to chance.
The mostly absent exploratory associations between the
momentary experiences reports and self-reported mindfulness
as assessed by the FFMQ are noteworthy. Only the Observe
facet of the FFMQ showed a significant association, namely,
with momentary exteroceptive reports. This correlation could
have been expected as most items of the Observe subscale
relate to observing sensory, albeit especially exteroceptive,
stimuli (Baer et al. 2006). The absent correlations with acting
with awareness, nonjudging, and nonreacting facets of the
FFMQ might also not be surprising as these mindfulness
facets are not assessed by the monitoring of momentary expe-
riences task. The describing facet correlated with the number
of reported thoughts, but not with other reports. This may
reflect the strong verbal orientation of both. It may be clear
that the FFMQ and the momentary experiences task assess
different phenomena, which may be seen as complementary
in meditation and awareness research.
Limitations and Future Research
A number of limitations of this study have to be acknowl-
edged. Obvious limitations include the relatively small sample
size, the heterogeneity of the meditator sample, and the cross-
sectional nature of the data collected at one measurement time,
not permitting any conclusions along causal lines. In addition,
despite the assumption that the verbal reports in the behavioral
task are mainly driven by selective attention reflecting subse-
quent awareness (Lachter et al. 2004; Van Calster et al. 2017;
Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2011), it cannot be excluded that some
forms of reporting bias may have occurred, such as due to
social desirability or habitual tendencies. The behavioral task
variables did not show any association with a measure of
social desirability in the current study, suggesting that this bias
may be limited in the present context. As the task consists of
the mere reporting of the current experience, which is multi-
faceted, habitual tendencies not related to social desirability in
this context probably mainly reflect attentional tendencies. As
attention and awareness are trained in meditation, these atten-
tional tendencies (e.g., to attend or not to attend to bodily
sensations) are expected to change with meditation.
Therefore, reflection of these tendencies in the scores of the
present task is a welcome part of the measure. Nevertheless,
future research should examine factors potentially biasing the
scores on this task. Finally, the sequence of tasks was not
counterbalanced. It cannot be excluded that this somehow
has influenced the associations found. Future studies should
mainly involve larger samples retesting associations found in
the present study and longitudinal or experimental designs to
study temporal dynamics and to be able to draw conclusions
about causality of the associations.
It is concluded that the total experienced meditator group
differed from non-meditators on various aspects of self-aware-
ness, both as assessed by evaluative self-report trait–like mea-
sures and by a behavioral task during which spontaneous mo-
mentary experiences are monitored. The behavioral measure
showed added value when comparing meditation subgroups,
Table 4 Estimated marginal
means and standard errors of








FFMQ: Observe 27.33 (2.34) 25.50 (2.10) 1.26
FFMQ: Describe 22.75 (2.39) 20.25 (2.14) 2.24
FFMQ: Actaware 21.20 (2.80) 23.60 (2.51) 1.51
FFMQ: Nonjudge 28.57 (2.46) 33.70 (2.21) 8.93**
FFMQ: Nonreact 21.55 (2.13) 24.45 (1.91) 3.81#
BIPM: Interest 20.58 (2.56) 19.35 (2.28) 0.47
BIPM: Insight 20.48 (3.00) 20.45 (2.67) 0.00
LEAS: Self-awareness 2.30 (0.22) 2.20 (0.19) 0.48
LEAS: Other-awareness 2.01 (0.22) 1.92 (0.20) 0.35
LEAS: Total awareness 2.74 (0.18) 2.49 (0.16) 3.95#
Interoception 2.36 (0.34) 0.99 (0.37) 7.88**
Exteroception 1.70 (0.75) 0.57 (0.86) 11.99**
Affect 1.26 (0.18) 1.26 (0.20) 0.00
Thinking 3.55 (0.34) 3.96 (0.38) 0.70
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; # 0.05 < p < 0.10; controlled for significant covariables (education or previous psycholog-
ical problems); hypotheses-related variables are in boldface
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yielding a difference in momentary interoceptive and extero-
ceptive experience reports, which was not visible when using
only the self-reports. Future studies should examine to what
extent this measure assesses a purely momentary state, a skill
that can be learned, or a trait that is reflected in momentary
performance. Whatever the outcome of those studies, behav-
ioral tasks may be of importance to include in future medita-
tion and self-awareness research.
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